



Report to the Committee on Armed  
Services, House of Representatives

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June 2014

# DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

## DOD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands

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# GAO Highlights

Highlights of [GAO-14-439](#), a report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

## Why GAO Did This Study

DOD operates three functional combatant commands, which provide special operations, strategic forces, and transportation. GAO was mandated to review personnel and resources of these commands in light of plans announced by DOD to reduce headquarters. This report (1) identifies the trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD's reductions to headquarters could result in cost savings.

GAO analyzed data for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 on authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations for the functional combatant commands and their service component commands. GAO also obtained documentation such as guidance and budget documents and interviewed officials regarding the commands' approach for implementing reductions to headquarters.

## What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure meaningful savings, (2) set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and (3) track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation, questioning, in part, the recommendation's scope, and concurred with the second and third recommendations. GAO continues to believe the first recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.

View [GAO-14-439](#). For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or [pendletonj@gao.gov](mailto:pendletonj@gao.gov).

June 2014

## DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

### DOD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands

## What GAO Found

GAO analysis of the resources devoted to the Department of Defense's (DOD) functional combatant commands shows substantial increases in authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations. Specifically, the number of authorized positions across the commands grew from 5,731 in fiscal year 2004 to 10,515 in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD officials, recent and emerging missions have driven up demands at all three functional combatant commands and driven the growth in authorized personnel. In addition, costs to support headquarters operations also increased substantially at the functional combatant commands. Data, in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, show that the combined costs to support headquarters operations for the commands increased from about \$296 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than \$1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013. Authorized positions and costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands supporting the functional combatant commands also increased. Specifically, authorized positions grew from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815 in fiscal year 2013, and costs to support headquarters operations increased from about \$614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about \$657 million in fiscal year 2013.

DOD's directed reductions to headquarters do not include all resources at the commands, which may affect DOD's ability to achieve significant savings in headquarters operations. In 2013, DOD directed reductions to management headquarters resources in an effort to streamline the department's management. However, GAO found that the department did not have a clear or accurate accounting of the resources being devoted to management headquarters to use as a starting point to track reductions. Officials noted that DOD relied on data self-reported by the commands, and GAO found that these data were potentially inconsistent and did not include the totality of headquarters resources.

Specifically, GAO found that less than a quarter of the positions at the functional combatant commands are considered to be management headquarters even though many positions appear to be performing management headquarters functions such as planning, budgeting, and developing policies. As such, more than three quarters of the headquarters positions at the functional combatant commands are potentially excluded from DOD's directed reductions. However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data. GAO has also concluded that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear goals and consolidation initiatives grounded in accurate and reliable data. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management headquarters by June 2014. Unless DOD reevaluates its decision to focus reductions to management headquarters and establishes a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to base reductions, the department will be unable to track and reliably report its headquarters reductions and ultimately may not realize significant savings.

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## Abbreviations

DOD	Department of Defense
SOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
STRATCOM	U.S. Strategic Command
TRANSCOM	U.S. Transportation Command

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June 26, 2014

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon  
Chairman  
The Honorable Adam Smith  
Ranking Member  
Committee on Armed Services  
House of Representatives

To support its worldwide military missions and meet evolving national security challenges, the Department of Defense (DOD) operates three functional combatant commands: U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Each have thousands of headquarters personnel who assist in carrying out the commands' worldwide responsibilities and providing unique capabilities in support to DOD's six geographic combatant commands and four military services.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, SOCOM provides special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests, while STRATCOM is responsible for conducting global operations to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, with missions including space, cyber, missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Finally, TRANSCOM is responsible for providing air, land, and sea transportation for DOD during times of peace and war, with a primary focus on wartime readiness. Generally, the combatant commanders have the authority to organize the structure of these commands to carry out assigned missions and responsibilities,<sup>2</sup> and do so with the support of

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<sup>1</sup>DOD has six geographic combatant commands responsible for missions in specific areas of the world: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.

<sup>2</sup>See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 164; Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* (Dec. 21, 2010).

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subordinate unified commands and service component commands, each of which also has its own staff.<sup>3</sup>

Like the rest of the federal government, DOD is operating in a constrained budget environment and facing difficult decisions about how to allocate its resources to meet mission requirements.<sup>4</sup> In addition, in January 2012, the administration released defense strategic guidance to direct defense priorities and spending over the coming decade.<sup>5</sup> The guidance states that DOD must continue to reduce the cost of doing business, which includes reducing the rate of growth in personnel costs and finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, in its business practices, and in other support activities. One approach the department has pursued in recent years to find cost savings is to reduce the footprint of headquarters staff, such as the combatant commands and their subordinate unified commands and respective service component commands. This approach includes establishing personnel baselines, identifying personnel reductions to achieve efficiencies, instituting caps on authorized civilian personnel, and limiting service support contract expenditures. Further, in July 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed a 20 percent cut in management headquarters spending throughout DOD, to include spending on government civilian personnel, facilities, and information technology. The cuts, which apply to all headquarters staff at the combatant commands and service component commands, are designed to streamline DOD's management through efficiencies and elimination of lower-priority activities.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Subordinate unified commands are established by the combatant commanders to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. Commanders of subordinate unified commands exercise operational control of assigned components and forces within the assigned operational area. A service component command consists of the commander and all those service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force.

<sup>4</sup>Among other constraints, the Budget Control Act of 2011 established requirements for automatic budget sequestration, setting caps on the levels of DOD spending from 2013 to 2021. See Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 365 (Aug. 2, 2011).

<sup>5</sup>Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Jan. 3, 2012).

<sup>6</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *20% Headquarters Reductions* (July 31, 2013).



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We have issued several reports in the past few years on defense headquarters and on the department's ability to determine the right number of personnel needed to perform headquarters functions. For example, in May 2013 we found that authorized military and civilian positions at the geographic combatant commands—excluding U.S. Central Command—had increased by about 50 percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2012.<sup>7</sup> We also found that DOD's process for sizing its combatant commands had several weaknesses, including the absence of a comprehensive, periodic review of the existing size and structure of these commands and inconsistent use of personnel-management systems to identify and track assigned personnel. DOD concurred with our recommendation that it improve its visibility over its headquarters personnel, but did not concur with our recommendation that it conduct comprehensive and periodic reviews of the combatant commands' existing size, as we discuss later in this report.<sup>8</sup> We are following up with DOD about its actions in response to our recommendations. In addition, in March 2012, we found that DOD did not have complete and reliable headquarters information available for use in making efficiency assessments and decisions. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities*,<sup>9</sup> to include all headquarters organizations; specify how contractors performing headquarters functions will be identified and included in headquarters reporting; clarify how components are to compile the information needed for headquarters reporting requirements; and establish time frames for implementing actions to improve tracking and reporting of headquarters resources. These headquarters organizations include the functional combatant commands and their service component commands. DOD generally concurred with

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<sup>7</sup>For purposes of this report, authorized positions refer to military and civilian positions that have been approved by DOD components for funding for a specific fiscal year. Also, assigned personnel refer to military and civilian personnel assigned to fill authorized or temporary positions, and other personnel performing contract services.

<sup>8</sup>GAO, *Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve Visibility of Combatant Commands' Resources*, [GAO-13-293](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2013). We reported separately on U.S. Central Command in early June 2014. See GAO, *Defense Headquarters: Guidance Needed to Transition U.S. Central Command's Costs to the Base Budget*, [GAO-14-440](#) (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2014).

<sup>9</sup>Department of Defense Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities* (Dec. 1, 2007) (incorporating change June 12, 2012).

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the findings and recommendations in that report.<sup>10</sup> In response to these recommendations, DOD officials stated that several efforts have been made to consolidate or eliminate commands, and centralize administrative and command support services, functions, or programs. DOD has also begun efforts to assess what headquarters organizations are not currently included in its guiding instruction on headquarters, but it has not completed its update of the instruction to include these organizations.

A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated us to review the personnel and resources of the functional combatant commands.<sup>11</sup> This report (1) identifies any trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013, and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD's directed reductions to headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting service component commands, could result in cost savings for the department.

To conduct this work we identified sources of information within DOD that would provide data on the resources of the functional combatant commands—SOCOM, STRATCOM, and TRANSCOM—to include their subordinate unified commands and corresponding service component commands. Specifically, to identify trends in resources devoted to these organizations, we obtained and analyzed available data on authorized military and civilian positions and operation and maintenance obligations from fiscal years 2001 through 2013. We focused our review on operation and maintenance obligations, as well as funding provided to TRANSCOM through the Transportation Working Capital Fund and SOCOM through the command's special operations-specific appropriations that provide funding for necessary special operations forces' unique capabilities and items, since these funds most appropriately reflect the primary mission

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<sup>10</sup>GAO, *Defense Headquarters: Further Efforts to Examine Resource Needs and Improve Data Could Provide Additional Opportunities for Cost Savings*, [GAO-12-345](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012).

<sup>11</sup>See H. Rep. No. 113-102 (June 7, 2013) accompanying H.R. 1960, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

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and headquarters support for the commands.<sup>12</sup> Unless otherwise noted, we reported all costs in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars.<sup>13</sup> Since historical data were unavailable in some cases, we limited our analysis of trends to authorized military and civilian positions at the combatant commands from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 and authorized military and civilian positions at the service component commands from fiscal years 2002 through 2013. We also obtained data on actual assigned personnel for fiscal year 2013. Using available data, we provided an analysis of trends in costs to support headquarters operations at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013, but since historical data were unavailable in some cases for the service component commands, we limited our analysis of trends to fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We also obtained and analyzed available data on contractors assigned to the commands, but based on the availability of data, we were not able to identify trends in contractors assigned to the individual commands. We assessed the reliability of the data given these and other limitations by interviewing DOD officials, incorporating data-reliability questions into our data-collection instruments, and comparing the multiple data sets received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

To determine the extent to which DOD's directed reductions to headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting service component commands, will result in cost savings for the department, we obtained and reviewed guidance and documentation on DOD's planned headquarters reductions, such as the department-issued memorandum outlining the reductions and various DOD budget-related data and documents. We then examined whether this information addressed some key questions we previously had developed for an agency to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate

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<sup>12</sup>For the purposes of this report, costs to support headquarters operations primarily reflect the costs for civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs, and include funds provided from DOD's operation and maintenance, Transportation Working Capital Fund, and SOCOM's special operations-specific appropriations. It does not include the costs associated with military personnel basic pay and allowances and other military personnel costs. It excludes funding obligations provided for DOD's overseas contingency operations.

<sup>13</sup>We adjusted costs for inflation using the deflator for DOD outlays by appropriation title—operation and maintenance, excluding the defense health program.

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management functions.<sup>14</sup> We developed these key questions by reviewing our reports on specific consolidation initiatives that have been undertaken, complementing this with information gathered through a review of the relevant literature on public-sector consolidations. In addition, we reviewed selected consolidation initiatives at the federal agency level and interviewed a number of individuals selected for their expertise in public management and government reform. For the current report, we obtained data on the total authorized positions at the functional combatant commands for fiscal year 2013 as well as the number of positions deemed by the commands to be performing headquarters functions and included in DOD's planned headquarters reductions. We assessed the reliability of the data given these and other limitations by interviewing DOD officials, incorporating data-reliability questions into our data-collection instruments, and comparing the multiple data sets received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed officials at the functional combatant commands, some of their respective subordinate unified commands, and the service component commands to discuss specific headquarters positions and organizations that could be affected by DOD's planned reductions to the commands and their components.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to June 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further details on our scope and methodology may be found in appendix I.

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<sup>14</sup>GAO, *Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and Management Functions*, [GAO-12-542](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2012).

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## Background

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### Combatant Command Responsibilities

DOD's Unified Command Plan sets forth basic guidance to all combatant commanders and establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of geographic responsibility among all the combatant commands.<sup>15</sup> There are currently nine combatant commands—six geographic and three functional. The six geographic combatant commands have responsibilities for accomplishing military operations in defined areas of operation and have a distinct regional military focus. The three functional combatant commands operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to the geographic combatant commands and the military services. In addition, each combatant command is supported by multiple service component commands that help provide and coordinate service-specific forces, such as units, detachments, organizations, and installations, to help fulfill the combatant commands' current and future operational requirements. Figure 1 is a map of the headquarters locations of the functional combatant commands, to include their subordinate unified commands and their respective service component commands.

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<sup>15</sup>DOD's Unified Command Plan is a key strategic document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by 10 U.S.C. § 161 to review the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of each combatant command not less often than every 2 years, and to recommend any changes to the President through the Secretary of Defense.

**Figure 1: Headquarters Locations of the Functional Combatant Commands, Their Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service Component Commands**

**Interactivity instructions:**  Roll over the combatant command name to see headquarters locations.  See appendix II for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.



Source: Department of Defense (DOD) (data); Map Resources (map). | GAO-14-439

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## Combatant Command Structure

Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the combatant commanders organize the structure of their commands as they deem necessary to carry out assigned missions. The commands' structure may include a principal staff officer; personal staff to the commander; a special staff group for technical, administrative, or tactical advice; and other staff groups that are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications systems.<sup>16</sup> The commands may also have liaisons or representatives from other DOD agencies and U.S. government organizations integrated into their staffs to help enhance the commands' effectiveness in accomplishing their missions. While the commands generally conform to these organizational principles, there may be variations in a command's structure based on its unique mission areas and responsibilities.

The staff of a combatant command or subordinate unified command is generally composed of military and civilian personnel drawn from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; personnel from other DOD components; interagency personnel; and other personnel associated with contracted services.<sup>17</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*, states that the commands are to consider a number of factors when determining personnel requirements,<sup>18</sup> including the total number of positions and the mix of military, civilian, and contractor support needed.<sup>19</sup> After the commands' personnel requirements have been determined and validated, the requirements are documented on each command's manning document, called the Joint Table of Distribution, which contains

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<sup>16</sup>Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar. 25, 2013), states that staff organization generally should conform to these organizational principles.

<sup>17</sup>Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

<sup>18</sup>Although DOD sometimes refers to "manpower requirements," we use "personnel requirements" throughout this report.

<sup>19</sup>According to Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix* (Apr. 12, 2010), DOD's workforce shall be established to successfully execute missions at a low-to-moderate level of risk. The instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for determining the appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel and contractor support within the department.

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permanent authorized positions for military, civilian, and other personnel responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the command.<sup>20</sup>

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## Military Service Supporting Responsibilities

Title 10 of the U.S. Code assigns the Secretaries of the military departments responsibility for a variety of tasks specific to their respective forces, to include organizing, equipping, and training tasks. In addition to these service-specific tasks, Title 10 of the U.S. Code also assigns the Secretaries of the military departments responsibility for assisting the combatant commands, to include responsibility for assigning all forces under their jurisdiction to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands and responsibility for carrying out functions to fulfill current and future operational requirements of the combatant commands.<sup>21</sup>

In addition to service-specific tasks, DOD Directive 5100.03, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands*, states that the military departments—as combatant command support agents—are responsible for programming, budgeting, and funding the administrative and logistical support of the headquarters of the combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. On an annual basis, each of the three military departments assess needs and develop a request for funding as part of their respective operation and maintenance budget justification to meet this requirement to support the combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. The directive assigns each military department responsibility for specific combatant commands and subordinate unified commands. As the combatant command support agent for the three functional combatant commands, the Air Force is responsible for allocating funding to combatant commands' mission areas, including the costs for civilian salaries, awards, and travel.<sup>22</sup> As such, the operating costs of these commands are generally subsumed

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<sup>20</sup>The Joint Table of Distribution is a personnel document that identifies positions and enumerates the spaces that have been approved for each organizational element of a joint activity for a specific fiscal year and those spaces that have been accepted for planning and programming purposes for the subsequent 5 fiscal years.

<sup>21</sup>See sections 162, 3013, 5013, and 8013 of Title 10, U.S. Code, for the responsibilities of the service Secretaries.

<sup>22</sup>The Army is the combatant command support agent for the Joint Special Operations Command, not the Air Force.



within the Air Force’s budget and funded through operation and maintenance appropriations. Table 1 provides a listing of the functional combatant commands, their subordinate unified commands, and the military departments that support them.

**Table 1: Functional Combatant Commands, Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Combatant Command Support Agents**

Command and subordinate commands	Support agent
Headquarters U.S. Special Operations Command	Secretary of the Air Force
Joint Special Operations Command <sup>a</sup>	Secretary of the Army
Headquarters U.S. Strategic Command	Secretary of the Air Force
Headquarters U.S. Cyber Command <sup>b</sup>	Secretary of the Air Force
Headquarters U.S. Transportation Command	Secretary of the Air Force

Source: GAO presentation of DOD information.

Notes: DOD information is from DOD Directive 5100.03, Support of the Headquarters of the Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands

<sup>a</sup>Joint Special Operations Command is a subordinate unified command under the Headquarters Special Operations Command.

<sup>b</sup>Headquarters, U.S. Cyber Command is a subordinate unified command under the Headquarters Strategic Command.

Other Combatant  
Command Funding

Some of the functional combatant commands also receive funding through appropriations other than operation and maintenance. Specifically, Title 10 of the U.S. Code gives the Commander, Special Operations Command, the authority to prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to SOCOM through a separate major force program category.<sup>23</sup> In addition, funding for TRANSCOM’s costs to support headquarters operations comes primarily from the Air Force’s Transportation Working Capital Fund, which is part of the Air Force Working Capital Fund.<sup>24</sup> Unlike the other

<sup>23</sup>See Title 10 U.S.C. §167 (e)(2)(B). A major force program is an aggregation of program elements that reflects a force or support mission of DOD, such as special operations, and contains the resources necessary to achieve a broad objective or plan relating to that mission.

<sup>24</sup>A working capital fund is a fund in which all income is derived from its operations and is available to finance the fund’s continuing operations. TRANSCOM’s working capital fund relies on sales revenue rather than regular appropriations to finance its continuing operations.

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combatant commands, TRANSCOM is operated in a fee-for-service manner and charges its customers for transportation services. TRANSCOM and its service component commands bill the customers for services rendered, customers transfer funds into the Transportation Working Capital Fund to pay the bill, and TRANSCOM and its service component commands receive payment from the Transportation Working Capital Fund. Officials noted that one component of these transportation costs is overhead, to include pay for civilian personnel, material and supplies, equipment, travel, and facility operations.

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## Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands Have Grown Considerably over the Last Decade

### Authorized Military and Civilian Positions Have Grown at the Functional Combatant Commands

Our analysis shows that the functional combatant commands' number of authorized positions has substantially increased since fiscal year 2004 primarily due to added missions and responsibilities.<sup>25</sup> Taken together, the authorized number of military and civilian positions for the three functional combatant commands almost doubled from 5,731 in fiscal year 2004 to 10,515 in fiscal year 2013.<sup>26</sup>

All three functional combatant commands' number of authorized positions grew. SOCOM's authorized military and civilian positions more than doubled from 1,885 in fiscal year 2004 to 4,093 in fiscal year 2013. According to SOCOM officials, an increase in authorized positions at the Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center and

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<sup>25</sup>We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions to fiscal years 2004 through 2013 because SOCOM did not have complete data on its authorized military and civilian positions for fiscal years 2001 through 2003.

<sup>26</sup>See apps. III, IV, and V for more information on the resources devoted to the functional combatant commands.

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the Joint Special Operations Command contributed to the growth at the command.<sup>27</sup> TRANSCOM's number of authorized military and civilian positions more than doubled from 863 in fiscal year 2004 to 1,956 in fiscal year 2013. According to TRANSCOM officials, the realignment of the Defense Courier Service from Air Mobility Command to TRANSCOM and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from the Joint Staff to TRANSCOM were the primary contributors to the increase in authorized positions at the command. STRATCOM's authorized military and civilian positions increased by 50 percent from 2,983 in fiscal year 2004 to 4,466 in fiscal year 2013. During this period, the creation of new organizations at STRATCOM to fill additional mission requirements, including Joint Functional Component Commands<sup>28</sup> (Integrated Missile Defense; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Global Strike; and Space), two Centers (U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center), and a subordinate unified command (United States Cyber Command),<sup>29</sup> were the primary contributors to the increase in authorized positions at the command. Figure 2 shows the number of authorized military and civilian positions at the functional combatant commands.


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<sup>27</sup>The Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center conducts research, development, acquisition, procurement, and logistics of special operations-specific equipment. The Joint Special Operations Command is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.

<sup>28</sup>The Joint Functional Component Commands are component commands to U.S. Strategic Command and have day-to-day responsibilities for operational- and tactical-level planning, execution, and management of forces for their respective mission areas. The commands plan and integrate operations for various mission-specific areas, to include space; global strike; integrated missile defense; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

<sup>29</sup>U.S. Cyber Command plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes, and conducts military cyberspace operations and defends specified DOD information networks.

**Figure 2: Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions at the Functional Combatant Commands, Fiscal Years 2004–2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

Note: We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions to fiscal years 2004 through 2013 because U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) could not provide data on its authorized military and civilian positions for fiscal years 2001 through 2003. Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded personnel requirements at the functional combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services.

As with our findings in our May 2013 report on the geographic combatant commands, we found that, over time, the functional combatant commands have become more reliant on civilian personnel to meet their mission needs.<sup>30</sup> Specifically, we found that the number of authorized civilian positions at the functional combatant commands almost tripled—from about 1,900 in fiscal year 2004 to about 5,200 in fiscal year 2013. According to DOD officials, the increase in authorized civilian positions is the result of attempts to rebalance workload and become a cost-efficient workforce, namely by converting positions filled by military personnel or in-sourcing services performed by contractors to civilian positions, and adding civilians in specific functional areas, such as intelligence and

<sup>30</sup> [GAO-13-293](#).


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cyber, to support warfighter needs.<sup>31</sup> As a result, the proportion of authorized civilian positions at the functional combatant commands increased from about one-third of authorized positions in 2001 to about half in 2013. However, the functional combatant commands also increased the number of military personnel to support the headquarters. This is reflected in our analysis, which shows that from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 the number of authorized military positions also increased, by about 40 percent, from 3,850 to more than 5,300. Figure 3 shows changes in the functional combatant commands' number of authorized military and civilian positions from fiscal years 2004 through 2013.

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<sup>31</sup>We previously found that while DOD had taken some steps to improve its understanding of its total workforce, several shortcomings remained, to include DOD not having updated its policies and procedures to reflect statutory requirements to use its civilian workforce plan and the inventory of contracted services to determine the appropriate mix of personnel to perform DOD's mission. We recommended that DOD revise its existing workforce policies and procedures to address the determination of the appropriate workforce mix and identification of critical functions and to include an explanation in annual budget exhibits of the methodology used to project contractor full-time equivalent estimates. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. GAO, *Human Capital: Additional Steps Needed to Help Determine the Right Size and Composition of DOD's Total Workforce*, [GAO-13-470](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2013).

**Figure 3: Functional Combatant Commands' Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions in Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

Note: We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions to fiscal years 2004 through 2013 because U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) could not provide data on its authorized military and civilian positions for fiscal years 2001 through 2003. Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded manpower requirements at the combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services.

Recent and emerging missions increased demands at all three functional combatant commands, according to DOD officials, and drove the growth in authorized positions. Since fiscal year 2001, DOD—including the functional combatant commands—has been supporting military operations to combat terrorism. According to DOD officials, these operations have relied heavily on special operations forces and have included the movement of materiel into two theaters. In addition, the department has seen the emergence of cyberspace as a significant warfighting domain. As operational requirements have increased, officials noted that the headquarters oversight required at the functional combatant commands has also increased, explaining some of the growth these commands have experienced since 2001. DOD officials noted that these demands have resulted in the Joint Staff validating increases in authorized positions on the commands' permanent manning documents.

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Our prior work on defense headquarters found several weaknesses in DOD's management of geographic combatant command resources that challenged the department's ability to make informed decisions regarding the commands' size and structure.<sup>32</sup> For instance, in May 2013 we found that DOD had a process for evaluating requests for additional authorized positions, but it did not periodically evaluate the commands' authorized positions to ensure they were needed to meet the commands' assigned missions. Our current work found that identified weaknesses persist today, and are applicable to the three functional combatant commands in this review. As a result of identified weaknesses, in May 2013 we recommended that the Secretary of Defense require a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant commands met assigned missions. DOD disagreed with our recommendation, stating that the combatant commands had already been reduced during previous budget reviews. Our report acknowledged and described several of the actions DOD had taken to manage growth at its combatant commands. However, we previously found and continue to maintain that these actions do not constitute a comprehensive, periodic review because DOD's actions have not included all authorized positions at the combatant commands. We continue to believe that institutionalizing a periodic evaluation of all authorized positions would help to systematically align manpower with those missions and add rigor to the requirements process. If DOD does not require a periodic reevaluation, it lacks reasonable assurance that the commands are properly sized to meet their assigned missions or that the commands can identify opportunities to carry out those missions more efficiently.

DOD has taken some steps to limit the growth in authorized positions at the unified combatant commands, including the functional combatant commands. In 2009 and 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established personnel baselines for the number of major headquarters activity positions at the combatant commands to provide more predictability over requirements for military and civilian positions.<sup>33</sup> In 2010, as part of the Secretary of Defense's 2010 efficiency initiative, the department was directed to take a number of steps to limit personnel growth, including instituting caps on authorized civilian personnel for fiscal

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<sup>32</sup>[GAO-13-293](#).

<sup>33</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandums, *Combatant Command Management Headquarters Manpower Baseline* (January 2009 and February 2010).

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years 2011 through 2013, including civilians at the combatant commands and service component commands.<sup>34</sup> To more effectively manage combatant command personnel levels and funding, in June 2011 the Secretary of Defense set limits for major headquarters activity civilian personnel at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2013 through 2017.<sup>35</sup> However, the memo states that military intelligence program, defense health program, transportation working capital fund, special operations—specific appropriations, and service component command personnel levels are excluded from the caps and baselines. Any growth above these limits in fiscal years 2013 through 2017 has to be validated by the Joint Staff and military services, and must be based on workload and funding considerations. The memo also states that the major headquarters activity baselines and business rules established for military positions in 2009 and 2010 were to remain in effect. These efforts are reflected in our analysis and data that show that authorized positions leveled off in 2012 and stayed about the same in fiscal year 2013.

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### Authorized Military and Civilian Positions Have Grown at the Service Component Commands

Our analysis of data provided by the service component commands of the functional combatant commands showed that the service component command positions also increased, although not as much as in the functional combatant commands that they support. Specifically, total authorized military and civilian positions for the service component commands increased from about 6,675 in fiscal year 2002 to about 7,815 in fiscal year 2013.<sup>36</sup> Changes in the authorized military and civilian positions at STRATCOM's and SOCOM's service component commands, as well as the establishment of new commands, drove the overall increase in total authorized positions, while the service component

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<sup>34</sup>Secretary of Defense, *Department of Defense (DOD) Efficiency Initiatives* (Aug. 16, 2010). As part of the 2010 efficiency initiatives, the department also reduced the size of the combatant command intelligence directorates. According to DOD officials, these caps have been subsequently extended past fiscal year 2013.


<sup>35</sup>Secretary of Defense, *Combatant Command (COCOM) Civilian and Contractor Manpower Management* (June 29, 2011).

<sup>36</sup>Each combatant command is supported by multiple service component commands that help provide and coordinate service-specific forces—such as units, detachments, organizations, and installations—to fulfill the command's current and future operational requirements. We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions at the service component commands to fiscal years 2002 through 2013 because data were not available for all of the commands prior to 2002.



commands supporting TRANSCOM reduced their total authorized positions over the period. Among the military services, the Air Force's service component commands saw the greatest increase in authorized positions, accounting for more than two thirds of the total increase in authorized military and civilian positions. This increase is primarily attributable to the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command—a service component command to STRATCOM—which was activated in fiscal year 2009 to develop and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations, and is responsible for the nation's intercontinental ballistic missile wings.<sup>37</sup> The creation of Air Force Global Strike Command added over 330 additional military positions in fiscal year 2010. Figure 4 shows the increase in authorized positions at the service component commands that we reviewed.

**Figure 4: Growth in Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions at the Functional Combatant Commands' Service Component Commands in Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>37</sup>Prior to the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command, two separate commands were responsible for the nuclear mission—Air Force Space Command and Air Combat Command. Air Force Space Command saw a reduction of 156 authorized positions in September 2010 as a result of the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command. We did not obtain information on the extent of changes in authorized positions at Air Combat Command because it was not part of our review.

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Note: Total authorized military and civilian positions represent approved funded manpower requirements at the combatant commands' service component commands and do not include personnel performing contract services. We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions at the service component commands to fiscal years 2002 through 2013 because data were not available for all of the commands prior to 2002. STRATCOM does not have a Navy service component command, but does have two Air Force service component commands (Air Force Global Strike Command and Air Force Space Command). U.S. Transportation Command does not have a Marine Corps service component command. The following organizations were established after fiscal year 2002 and therefore data in prior years do not include these commands: Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command (fiscal year 2003), Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (fiscal year 2006), and Air Force Global Strike Command (fiscal year 2009).

We found that the service component commands' authorized military and civilian mix has changed slightly since fiscal year 2002. In fiscal year 2002 the mix was 55 percent civilian and 45 percent military, and in fiscal year 2013 the mix was about 60 percent civilian and 40 percent military.<sup>38</sup>

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### Trends in Contractor Full-Time Equivalents Not Identifiable Due to Data Variations across the Commands

The availability of data on contractor full-time equivalents varied across the combatant commands, and thus trends in full-time equivalents were not identifiable.<sup>39</sup> DOD officials stated the department generally tracks and reports expenditures for contract services, and that the combatant commands were not required to maintain historical data on the number of contractor personnel. As a result, we found that the combatant commands had taken varied steps to collect data on contractor full-time equivalents. We also found that the data on the number of personnel performing contract services at the service component commands varied or were unavailable, and thus trends could not be identified. We found that some service component commands do not maintain data on the number of personnel performing contract services, and others used different methods to track these personnel, for instance counting the number of contractors on hand or the number of identification badges issued.

In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation to help improve DOD's ability to manage its acquisition of services; to make more strategic

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<sup>38</sup>We limited our analysis of authorized military and civilian positions to fiscal years 2002 through 2013 because data were not available for all of the service component commands prior to fiscal year 2002.

<sup>39</sup> A full-time equivalent is a standard measure of labor that equates to one year of full-time work (labor hours as defined by the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 each year).

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decisions about the right workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel; and to better align resource needs through the budget process to achieve that mix. For example, Section 2330a of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to annually compile and review an inventory of activities performed by contractors pursuant to contracts for services. Moreover, our work over the past decade on DOD's contracting activities has noted the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted services and personnel to enable it to make more-informed management decisions, ensure department-wide goals and objectives are achieved, and have the resources to achieve desired outcomes.<sup>40</sup> In response to our past work, DOD has outlined its approach to document contractor full-time equivalents and collect personnel data from contractors in DOD's inventory of contract services. However, DOD does not expect to fully collect contractor personnel data until fiscal year 2016.

While the department continues to compile its data on contractors, it has also taken steps to reduce the use of contractors to fill headquarters-type activities. In his June 2011 memo, the Secretary of Defense established limits on service support contract expenditures at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. Specifically, the memo directed the combatant commands and the services to limit total expenditures on services support contracts across operation and maintenance; research, development, test, and evaluation; and procurement accounts.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 imposed limits on DOD's contract services for fiscal years 2012 and 2013, to include limiting DOD's total obligations for contract services in each fiscal year not to exceed the amount requested

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<sup>40</sup>See GAO, *Defense Acquisitions: Update on DOD's Efforts to Implement a Common Contractor Manpower Data System*, [GAO-14-491R](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2014); GAO, *Defense Acquisitions: Continued Management Attention Needed to Enhance Use and Review of DOD's Inventory of Contracted Services*, [GAO-13-491](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2013); *Defense Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for DOD's Inventory of Contracted Services*, [GAO-12-357](#) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2012); *Defense Headquarters: Further Efforts to Examine Resources Needs and Improve Data Could Provide Additional Opportunities for Cost Savings*, [GAO-12-345](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012); *Defense Acquisitions: Further Action Needed to Better Implement Requirements for Conducting Inventory of Service Contract Activities*, [GAO-11-192](#) (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2011); and *Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes*, [GAO-07-20](#) (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006).

<sup>41</sup>Secretary of Defense, *Combatant Command (COCOM) Civilian and Contractor Manpower Management*.

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for these services in the fiscal year 2010 President's Budget Request.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 extends these limits into fiscal year 2014.<sup>43</sup>

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### Costs to Support Headquarters Operations Have Grown for Combatant and Service Component Commands

Total costs to support headquarters operations at the three functional combatant commands we reviewed increased substantially from fiscal years 2001 to 2013. Our analysis of data provided by the commands shows that the costs to support headquarters operations—including costs for civilian pay, contract services, travel, and equipment—increased more than fourfold in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars, from about \$296 million in fiscal year 2001 to more than \$1.236 billion in fiscal year 2013.<sup>44</sup> A primary driver for the growth in costs has been the increase in SOCOM's costs to support headquarters operations, which increased more than sixfold, from about \$75 million in fiscal year 2001 to almost \$467 million in fiscal year 2013. Costs increased across SOCOM headquarters and subordinate organizations, to include the Special Operations Research, Development and Acquisition Center, the theater special operations commands, and the Joint Special Operations Command.<sup>45</sup> Also, STRATCOM's costs to support headquarters operations almost quadrupled, from about \$164 million in fiscal year 2001 to almost \$624 million in fiscal year 2013. This increase in STRATCOM's costs was largely driven by the costs to establish and operate several new subordinate organizations—Joint Functional Component Commands and U.S. Cyber Command—which reflect new missions and responsibilities assigned to STRATCOM over time. TRANSCOM's costs to support headquarters operations more than doubled, from about \$56 million in fiscal year 2001 to \$145 million in fiscal year 2013. Growth in civilian pay and purchased services and equipment drove the increases in TRANSCOM's costs to support headquarters operations. In addition, the

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<sup>42</sup>Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 808 (2011).


<sup>43</sup>Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 802 (2013).

<sup>44</sup>All costs to support headquarters operations in this report are in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars unless otherwise noted. Costs were adjusted for inflation using the deflator for DOD outlays by appropriation title—operation and maintenance, excluding the defense health program.

<sup>45</sup>Theater Special Operations Commands are headquarters organizations that support the geographic combatant commands with logistics, planning, and operational control of special operations forces in their assigned regions.

transfer of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from the Joint Staff in fiscal year 2012 added tens of millions of dollars to TRANSCOM's headquarters support costs. Figure 5 shows the overall change in the costs to support headquarters operations at the three functional combatant commands that we reviewed for fiscal years 2001 and 2013.

**Figure 5: Functional Combatant Command Costs to Support Headquarters Operations in Fiscal Years 2001 and 2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

Note: Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for general purpose operation and maintenance funding, special operations forces funding, and working capital fund costs reported by DOD components and are represented in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars. These costs include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs, but do not include costs associated with military personnel basic pay and allowances and other military personnel costs, costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, or costs for overseas contingency operations. See app. VI for nominal costs to support headquarters operations.

Total costs in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars to support headquarters operations increased slightly at the service component commands we reviewed, from about \$614 million in fiscal year 2008 to about \$657

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
million in fiscal year 2013.<sup>46</sup> Among the services, the Air Force's service component commands saw the greatest increase in costs to support headquarters operations, primarily due to the establishment of Air Force Global Strike Command, which first reported costs in fiscal year 2010. Air Force costs were also driven by growth in costs for civilian pay associated with Air Force Space Command. In addition, SOCOM's service component commands also experienced cost increases from fiscal years 2008 through 2013, primarily due to increases in costs for civilian pay. Conversely, TRANSCOM's service component commands reduced their costs to support headquarters operations over the time period. Figure 6 shows the changes in the costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands that we reviewed for fiscal years 2008 and 2013.

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<sup>46</sup>All costs to support headquarters operations in this report are in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars unless otherwise noted. Costs were adjusted for inflation using the deflator for DOD outlays by appropriation title—operation and maintenance, excluding the defense health program. We limited our analysis of costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands to fiscal years 2008 through 2013 because data were not available for all of the commands prior to 2008.

**Figure 6: Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations in Fiscal Years 2008 and 2013**

Fiscal year 2013 dollars in millions



FY: Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

Note: Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for general purpose operation and maintenance funding, special operations forces funding, and working capital fund costs reported by DOD components and are presented in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars. These costs include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs, but do not include costs associated with military personnel basic pay and allowances and other military personnel costs, costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, or costs for overseas contingency operations. We focused our analysis of costs to support headquarters operations at the service component commands on fiscal year 2008 because data were not available for all of the commands prior to 2008. See app. VI for nominal costs to support headquarters operations.

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## DOD's Headquarters Reductions Do Not Include All Command Resources, Thus Affecting DOD's Ability to Achieve Significant Cost Savings

In 2013, the Secretary of Defense set a target for reducing management headquarters budgets by 20 percent, but we found that DOD did not have an accurate accounting of the budgets and personnel associated with management headquarters to use as a starting point for reductions. Our work also found that management headquarters include about a quarter of the personnel at the commands—of the 10,500 authorized positions at the functional combatant commands, about 2,500 are considered to be management headquarters. As a result, about three-quarters of the authorized positions at the commands in our review are not included in the potential reductions. Moreover, without a clear and consistently applied starting point for reductions, it will be difficult for DOD to reliably track savings to management headquarters in the future.

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## DOD's Planned Reductions to Headquarters Budgets Are Based on Self-Reported and Potentially Inconsistent Data

DOD relied on self-reported and potentially inconsistent data when implementing the Secretary of Defense's planned headquarters reductions. In July 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced in a memorandum that the Secretary of Defense had directed reductions to DOD headquarters, to include the functional combatant commands, in an effort to streamline DOD's management and eliminate lower-priority activities.<sup>47</sup> The memorandum directed a 20 percent reduction to DOD components' total management headquarters budgets for fiscal years 2014 through 2019, including costs for civilian personnel, contract services, facilities, information technology, and other costs that support headquarters functions. As outlined in budget documents, the targeted savings goal of 20 percent of headquarters operating budgets is to be realized by fiscal year 2019, with incremental savings each year beginning fiscal year 2015. DOD budget documents project the reductions will yield a total savings of about \$5.3 billion over the period, with most savings coming in 2019.

DOD began efforts to initiate reductions to headquarters during the development of the fiscal year 2015 President's Budget. According to DOD officials, the department used the end of the 5-year defense plan within the fiscal year 2014 President's Budget, or fiscal year 2018, as a point to base the targeted savings goal of 20 percent of headquarters budgets through fiscal year 2019, with costs adjusted for inflation. Officials told us that the parameters for these savings were established so

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<sup>47</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *20% Headquarters Reductions*.



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the department could achieve already-planned savings from prior efficiencies. DOD officials noted that the Secretary of Defense provided general guidance as to what should be considered management headquarters for the commands to use when identifying their total headquarters budgets and directed commands to include only operation and maintenance funding. Because the department does not have complete and reliable information on the resources being devoted to management headquarters, officials noted that each individual component was asked to identify and self-report its management headquarters operating budget from which reductions would be based. DOD officials further noted that after the individual components determined what they considered their management headquarters budgets to be, officials from DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation reviewed the documentation to ensure it was reflective of the intent of the reductions.

DOD focused its reductions on management headquarters, or major DOD headquarters activities,<sup>48</sup> because, according to officials, doing so would ensure that the department saved as much money as possible for the warfighting elements. However, by relying on DOD components to self-report their total management headquarters budgets, DOD cannot ensure these self-reported budgets were captured consistently or reflect total headquarters costs among the commands. DOD officials reported that each of the combatant commands developed different approaches for identifying the population of resources on which to base reductions. Ultimately, officials determined that reductions would be based only on operation and maintenance funds.

We also found that the underlying data are often tracked in an inconsistent manner. During the course of our review, we found that the functional combatant commands and service component commands had different ways of capturing total costs to support headquarters operations. All of the commands included costs for categories like civilian compensation, and travel and transportation expenses. However, some

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<sup>48</sup>According to DOD Directive 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities* is defined as headquarters whose primary mission is to manage or command the programs and operations of DOD and its components and their major military units, organizations, or agencies. The instruction provides an official list of the organizations covered by the instruction, including the functional combatant commands and their supporting service component commands. DOD officials use the terms management headquarters and major DOD headquarters activities interchangeably.

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commands included categories such as software for command-specific systems as well as command-specific equipment. Based on discussions with DOD officials, it is unclear whether the commands were consistent in their approaches for identifying and self-reporting the information they provided.

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### Some Costs and Authorized Positions Are Not Included in DOD's Planned Headquarters Reductions

Our analysis shows that not all costs and authorized positions are included in DOD's planned headquarters reductions and that all of the functional combatant commands exclude most of their authorized staffs from management headquarters totals. While the trends we described earlier in this report include the entire commands, we gathered information directly from the commands to determine how much of their organizations they considered management headquarters. We found that less than a quarter of their personnel are designated as management headquarters. This designation is critical because the Deputy Secretary of Defense's July 2013 memorandum directed a 20 percent reduction to DOD components' total management headquarters budgets for fiscal years 2014 through 2019, including costs for civilian personnel, contract services, facilities, information technology, and other costs that support headquarters functions. In addition, the memorandum noted that organizations should strive for a goal of 20 percent reductions in authorized government civilian staff at the headquarters as well as a goal of 20 percent reductions in military personnel billets on management headquarters staffs.<sup>49</sup>


On the basis of our analysis of data on authorized positions at the functional combatant commands and their service component commands, we found that the commands designate less than a quarter of the total authorized positions as part of their management headquarters functions. Specifically, about 2,500 of about 10,500 total authorized positions are accounted for in the functional commands' management headquarters position totals. As a result, a 20 percent reduction to management headquarters could result in a relatively small cut to the total number of positions at the three functional combatant commands. Specifically, as figure 7 shows, a 20 percent reduction to management headquarters positions means that, combined, the functional combatant commands

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<sup>49</sup>Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, *20% Headquarters Reductions*.

would have to eliminate about 500 positions, or less than 5 percent of the overall authorized positions at the commands.

**Figure 7: Reductions Needed in Management Headquarters Positions at the Functional Combatant Commands to Meet the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 20 Percent Goals**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

Compared to the functional combatant commands, the service component commands have a larger percentage of authorized positions included in their management headquarters totals. Based on our analysis of data on authorized positions at the service component commands, about 6,000 of about 7,800 total authorized positions are accounted for in the management headquarters position totals (77 percent). As such, a 20 percent reduction to management headquarters positions means that, combined, the service component commands would have to eliminate about 1,200 positions, or about 15 percent of the overall authorized positions at the commands. This reduction is larger than the 5 percent reduction that would be required at the functional combatant commands if the reductions are based on management headquarters totals, as DOD calculated them.

We further analyzed data provided by the individual functional combatant commands to determine what they included in their management headquarters totals. The proportion of personnel considered to be in management headquarters positions at the three functional combatant commands ranged from 20 to 28 percent of their overall personnel based on their 2013 authorized positions. DOD officials explained that the positions that are not accounted for in management headquarters positions perform more operationally focused tasks and functions. For example, STRATCOM officials stated that positions within the command’s Joint Functional Component Commands for Global Strike; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Integrated Missile Defense; and Space are not included in the command’s management headquarters totals because the positions within these components and the missions

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they perform are operational in nature. Similarly, TRANSCOM officials told us that because the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command is a deployable operational command component, all authorized positions within this component are excluded from the command's management headquarters totals. Moreover, officials at each of the functional combatant commands told us that some authorized positions within their headquarters—such as those within the intelligence and operations directorates—are not considered management headquarters positions because these positions perform operational tasks and functions.

Examples of the positions within the individual commands that are included in management headquarters and those that are not are as follows:

- About 20 percent of SOCOM's reported total authorized positions, or about 800 of 4,100 authorized positions, are included in the command's management headquarters position totals. According to officials, positions not included in management headquarters functions include 267 authorized positions in the Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center; the entirety of the Joint Special Operations Command headquarters; and certain positions within command directorates such as intelligence and operations. For example, only 1 of the 473 authorized military and civilian positions in the intelligence directorate is included in the command's management headquarters position totals.
- About 28 percent of STRATCOM's reported total authorized positions, or about 1,200 of 4,500 total positions, are included in the command's management headquarters position totals. According to officials, positions not counted as part of the command's management headquarters totals include 1,544 authorized positions in the command's Joint Functional Component Commands; 918 authorized positions at U.S. Cyber Command; and 64 authorized positions in the command's J9 Mission Assessment and Analysis Directorate.<sup>50</sup>
- About 24 percent of TRANSCOM's reported total authorized positions, or about 500 of 2,000 positions, are included in the command's management headquarters position totals. According to officials,


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<sup>50</sup>STRATCOM's J9 Mission Assessment and Analysis Directorate provides assessments and analyses that identify risks and alternatives to consider when making strategic decisions.

positions that are excluded from this total include about 260 authorized positions that are part of the Defense Courier Service, among others.

Figure 8 shows the number of authorized positions within the functional combatant commands in fiscal year 2013 included in management headquarters totals and the number not included.

**Figure 8: Comparison of Authorized Positions Included in Management Headquarters Totals and Those That Are Not, Fiscal Year 2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data. | GAO-14-439

While the functional combatant commands have components and associated positions that are more operational in nature, we found that each of these operational components have personnel that perform management headquarters functions, such as conducting planning, budgeting, and developing policies. For example, STRATCOM officials noted that the Joint Functional Component Commands have resource-management personnel that manage the component commands' funding, which is a headquarters function, as defined in DOD Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities*. However, STRATCOM excludes these personnel from its management headquarters totals because, according to STRATCOM officials, the headquarters directorates at these component commands are relatively small and personnel rely heavily on STRATCOM for support in these functional areas. Moreover, a majority of the positions in SOCOM's research, development, and acquisition center, which manages and supports the development, acquisition, and fielding of critical items for special operations forces, are not included in the command's management headquarters totals even though these personnel perform headquarters-specific functions as defined in DOD Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities*.

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## Absent a Clear Starting Point, Savings Will Be Difficult to Track

DOD's reduction initiatives targeted management headquarters, and the department reported a savings estimate from these reductions in its fiscal year 2015 budget submission, but because the department did not have a reliable way to determine the resources being devoted to such headquarters as a starting point, actual savings will be difficult to track. Specifically, DOD officials acknowledged the limitations of management headquarters data, stating that they did not have an operationally clear definition and good data about what constituted management headquarters, and agreed that this made it difficult to establish a starting point for reductions. However, the department does not have any plans to reevaluate the baseline on which the reductions are based, in part because it does not have an alternative source for complete and reliable data. Moreover, DOD reported in its fiscal year 2015 budget submission that reductions to management headquarters staffs will result in a savings of \$5.3 billion through fiscal year 2019 in comparison to DOD's overall expected \$2.7 trillion budget over those fiscal years. The department based this total on incremental savings from reductions being realized each year from fiscal years 2015 through 2019. However, this represents a savings of about 2/10 of 1 percent. If DOD's headquarters reductions do not have a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point on which to target savings—and reductions are only focused on what the commands have self-reported as management headquarters activities—then the department may not be able to track its savings to management headquarters or assure that reductions are achieved as intended.

Accounting for management headquarters is a long-standing challenge for DOD that has created problems before in tracking savings. In October 1997, in the wake of the mid-1990s military drawdown, we found that total personnel and costs of defense headquarters were significantly higher than were being reported. At the time, we found that about three-fourths of subordinate organizations excluded from the management headquarters accounting were actually performing management or management support functions and that such accounting masked the true size of DOD's headquarters organizations.<sup>51</sup> In March 2012, we concluded that DOD's data on its headquarters personnel lacked completeness and reliability necessary for use in making efficiency

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<sup>51</sup>GAO, *Defense Headquarters: Total Personnel and Costs Are Significantly Higher Than Reported to Congress*, GAO/NSIAD-98-25 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 1997).

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assessments and decisions.<sup>52</sup> We recommended that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities*,<sup>53</sup> to include all headquarters organizations; specify how contractors performing headquarters functions will be identified and included in headquarters reporting; clarify how components are to compile the information needed for headquarters-reporting requirements; and establish time frames for implementing actions to improve tracking and reporting of headquarters resources. DOD generally concurred with the findings and recommendations in that report and is taking steps to address the recommendations. For example, DOD has begun the process of updating DOD Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities*, to include all major DOD headquarters activity organizations. However, the department has not yet taken actions to fully address our recommendations. In April 2003, we testified on the importance of periodically reexamining whether current programs and activities remain relevant, appropriate, and effective in an agency's ability to deliver on its mission and noted that restructuring efforts must be focused on clear goals.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, key questions that agencies should consider when evaluating organizational consolidation note that the key to any consolidation initiative is the identification of and agreement on specific goals, with the goals of the consolidation being evaluated against a realistic assessment of how the consolidation can achieve them. We further noted that any consolidation initiatives must be grounded in accurate and reliable data.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, unless these issues are addressed, the department may be unable to convince external stakeholders, such as Congress, that its actions will address overhead in a meaningful way. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 requires that DOD develop and submit a plan for streamlining management

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<sup>52</sup>GAO, *Defense Headquarters: Further Efforts to Examine Resource Needs and Improve Data Could Provide Additional Opportunities for Cost Savings*, [GAO-12-345](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 2012).

<sup>53</sup>Department of Defense Instruction 5100.73, *Major DOD Headquarters Activities* (Dec. 1, 2007).

<sup>54</sup>GAO, *Executive Reorganization Authority: Balancing Executive and Congressional Roles in Shaping the Federal Government's Structure*, [GAO-03-624T](#) (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).

<sup>55</sup>[GAO-12-542](#).

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headquarters, to include the combatant commands, by June 2014.<sup>56</sup> The plan is to include a description of the planned changes or reductions in staffing and services and the estimated cumulative savings to be achieved from fiscal years 2015 through 2024. According to officials, DOD has not yet decided how it plans to track its management headquarters reductions and report to Congress to satisfy this statutory requirement. Without establishing a starting point for reductions that includes all headquarters personnel and resources within these commands, it is unclear how the department will provide reliable information to Congress. Moreover, since the universe of resources that DOD has identified for headquarters reductions is relatively small compared to the overall size of the functional combatant commands, unless the department reevaluates its decision to base reductions on management headquarters, it may not ultimately realize significant savings.

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## Conclusions

As it faces a potentially extended period of fiscal constraints, DOD has concluded that reducing the resources it devotes to headquarters is a reasonable area to achieve cost savings. However, by focusing the reductions on management headquarters budgets and personnel—which tend to be inconsistently defined and often represent a small portion of the overall headquarters—in the way it has, the department is, in effect, shielding much of the resources it directs to headquarters organizations like those of the functional combatant commands. Unless the department reevaluates its decision to focus reductions on management headquarters and sets a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point from which to base budgetary and staff reductions at headquarters organizations and track them, DOD is likely to face difficulties ensuring that its actions result in significant overhead savings. As the department continues to identify efficiencies in its operations and potential reductions in overhead, accurately identifying the universe of resources that DOD dedicates to headquarters and using that as a starting point for reductions would help DOD ensure it achieves savings. Finally, managing headquarters resources is a long-standing challenge at DOD. We have previously recommended that DOD improve the accounting of management headquarters functions and develop a process to periodically revalidate the size and structure of the combatant commands.

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<sup>56</sup>Pub. L. No. 113-66, §904 (2013).



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We believe that these recommendations apply to the functional combatant commands in this review, and are still valid, and thus are making no new recommendations on these issues.

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## Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve the management of DOD's headquarters-reduction efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:

1. Reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure the department's efforts ultimately result in meaningful savings.
2. Set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions.
3. Track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress.

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## Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation and concurred with the second and third recommendations. DOD's comments are summarized below and reprinted in their entirety in appendix VIII.

DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure the department's efforts ultimately result in meaningful savings. DOD stated that this department-wide recommendation would garner greater savings. However, DOD officials raised concerns that the recommendation seemed to be outside the scope of the review, which focused on the functional combatant commands, and with our distinction between management headquarters and below-the-line organizations and the functions that personnel in these positions perform. We agree that the recommendation has implications beyond the functional combatant commands. While our review was focused on the functional combatant commands, the issue we identified is not limited to these commands. The findings related to the three functional combatant commands illustrate a fundamental challenge facing the department in its efforts to reduce headquarters overhead. As discussed in this report, we have previously reported on problems with the way that DOD accounts for management headquarters across the department. As part of this review, we found that DOD did not have an

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accurate accounting of the budgets and personnel associated with management headquarters to use as a starting point for reductions. Given the longstanding issues with accounting for management headquarters, we believe the recommendation that the Secretary reevaluate the decision to focus the department's reduction efforts on management headquarters is appropriate.

The department also stated in its letter that while the Secretary of Defense's reductions were focused on management headquarters, the military services were allowed to reduce below-the-line organizations—those not designated as management headquarters—which includes elements of the combatant commands. According to DOD, these reductions will range from 3 percent up to 15 percent depending on the military service. We recognize that the military services plan to implement reductions that may result in savings at some non-management headquarters organizations across the department. However, the department's response did not delineate how these reductions were determined, how they were applied by the military services, or how much the actions would ultimately save the department. Further, in discussions, DOD officials raised concerns about our distinction between management headquarters and below-the-line organizations and the functions that personnel in these positions perform. As noted in the report, we understand the distinctions as defined in guidance between management headquarters and below-the-line organizations, or those not considered to be part of an organization's management headquarters. However, our analysis focused on the extent to which the functional combatant commands reported that personnel were performing management functions, and we noted that this data was self-reported and potentially inconsistent. The intent of the recommendation was to focus on positions not included in the commands' assessment of management headquarters positions, but in response to DOD's concern, we modified the recommendation to clarify that the goal of ensuring cost savings was related to the assessment of personnel performing management functions versus the definition of people included in management headquarters totals.

In its comments, the department also questioned the use of Joint Table of Distribution data from DOD's Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System versus the Future Years Defense Program data in DOD's Defense Resources Data Warehouse for this study. We attempted to use the data warehouse as part of our prior work examining the resources devoted to the geographic combatant commands in May 2013; however, after querying the database, Joint Staff officials explained that the data it

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yielded were unreliable. Therefore, the officials suggested that we obtain the authorized position and costs to support headquarters operations data directly from the combatant commands and service component commands. DOD noted in its comments that the data trends may be skewed since the Joint Table of Distribution presents a point-in-time look at on-hand personnel. For this review, we focused on authorized positions as documented on the combatant command's Joint Tables of Distribution rather than focusing on personnel on hand because data on authorized positions provided the most accurate and repeatable data to identify trends. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A, Joint Manpower and Personnel Program, notes that Joint Tables of Distribution are documented in the Joint Staff's Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System which is DOD's system of record to document the unified combatant commands' organizational structure and track the manpower and personnel required to meet the combatant commands' assigned missions. The instruction also states that manpower authorizations on the Joint Table of Distribution should be compared with the Future Years Defense Program and any disconnects must be resolved. Finally, in January 2012, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff issued a memo identifying its Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System as the authoritative data source for DOD and for congressional inquiries of joint personnel, stating that the system must accurately reflect the manpower and personnel allocated to joint organizations, such as the combatant commands, to provide senior leaders with the necessary data to support decision making in a fiscally constrained environment. Therefore, we maintain that the use of authorized military and civilian positions from the combatant command's Joint Tables of Distribution, as documented in DOD's Electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System, was appropriate for our review of the resources devoted to the functional combatant commands.

DOD concurred with the second and third recommendations that the Secretary of Defense: set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions, and track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress. In its response, DOD recommended the use of the Future Years Defense Program data to set the baseline going forward and stated that it was enhancing data elements within DOD's Resource Data Warehouse to better identify management headquarters resources to facilitate tracking and reporting across the department. We agree that enhancements to the data elements will increase DOD's capability to track and report management headquarters resources across the department and, thus, the Future Years Defense Program data

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could be used to set baselines and track future reductions. These enhancements, if implemented, would address the intent of the recommendations.

DOD also provided what it considered significant points of fact. However, we considered these were technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

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We are sending a copy of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the military departments. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at <http://www.gao.gov>.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3489 or [pendletonj@gao.gov](mailto:pendletonj@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John H. Pendleton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "John" and last name "Pendleton" clearly legible.

John Pendleton, Director  
Defense Capabilities and Management

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# Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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We conducted this work in response to a mandate from the House Armed Services Committee to review the personnel and resources of the functional combatant commands.<sup>1</sup> This report (1) identifies any trends in resources devoted to the functional combatant commands and their service component commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013 to meet their assigned missions and responsibilities, and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense's (DOD) directed reductions to headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting service component commands, could result in cost savings for the department.

To conduct this work and address our objectives, we identified sources of information within DOD that would provide data on the resources devoted to the functional combatant commands—U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)—to include their subordinate unified commands and their corresponding service components commands.

To identify trends in the resources devoted to DOD's functional combatant commands, including their subordinate unified commands and their service component commands, we obtained and analyzed data on available authorized military and civilian positions, and operation and maintenance obligations, from each of the commands and their corresponding service component commands from fiscal years 2001 through 2013. We focused our review on authorized positions, as these reflect the approved, funded manpower requirements at each of the functional combatant commands. To provide insight into the number of personnel assigned to each command, we obtained data on actual assigned personnel for fiscal year 2013. We also obtained and analyzed available data on contractors assigned to the commands, but based on the availability of data, we were not able to identify trends in contractors assigned to the individual commands. Our review also focused on operation and maintenance obligations—because these obligations reflect the primary costs to support headquarters operations of the combatant commands, their subordinate unified commands and other activities, and corresponding service component commands—including

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<sup>1</sup>See H. Rep. No. 113-102 (June 7, 2013) accompanying H.R. 1960, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.

the costs for civilian personnel, contract services, travel, and equipment, among others. We included funds provided to TRANSCOM through the Transportation Working Capital Fund and to SOCOM through the command's special operations—specific appropriations that provides funding for necessary special operations forces' unique capabilities and items since these funds most appropriately reflect the primary mission and headquarters support for the commands.<sup>2</sup> Our review excluded obligations of operation and maintenance funding for DOD's overseas contingency operations not part of DOD's base budget. Unless otherwise noted, we reported all costs in this report in constant fiscal year 2013 dollars.<sup>3</sup> Since historical data were unavailable in some cases, we limited our review of the combatant commands authorized positions to fiscal years 2004 through 2013, and authorized military and civilian positions at the service component commands to fiscal years 2002 through 2013. Using available data, we provided an analysis of trends in operation and maintenance obligations at the combatant commands for fiscal years 2001 through 2013, but since historical data were unavailable in some cases for the service component commands, we limited our analysis of trends to fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We obtained data on actual assigned personnel for fiscal year 2013. To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed DOD officials and analyzed relevant manpower and financial-management documentation to ensure that the authorized positions and data on operation and maintenance obligations that the commands provided were tied to mission and headquarters support. We also incorporated data-reliability questions into our data-collection instruments and compared the multiple data sets received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

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<sup>2</sup>For the purposes of this report, costs to support headquarters operations primarily reflect the costs for civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs, and include funds provided from DOD's operation and maintenance, Transportation Working Capital Fund, and SOCOM's special operation—specific appropriations. It does not include the costs associated with military personnel basic pay and allowances and other military personnel costs. It excludes funding obligations provided for DOD's overseas contingency operations.

<sup>3</sup>In this report, we adjusted costs for inflation using the deflator for DOD outlays by appropriation title—operation and maintenance, excluding the defense health program.

To determine the extent to which DOD's directed reductions to headquarters, like the functional combatant commands and supporting service component commands, will result in cost savings for the department, we obtained and reviewed guidance and documentation on DOD's and the services' planned headquarters reductions, such as the department-issued memorandum outlining the reductions and various DOD budget-related data and documents. We then examined whether this information addressed some key questions we had developed for an agency to consider when evaluating proposals to consolidate management functions. We developed these key questions by reviewing our reports on specific consolidation initiatives that have been undertaken, complementing this with information gathered through a review of the relevant literature on public-sector consolidations produced by academic institutions, professional associations, think tanks, news outlets, and various other organizations. In addition, as illustrative examples for this prior work, we reviewed selected consolidation initiatives at the federal agency level and interviewed a number of individuals selected for their expertise in public management and government reform.<sup>4</sup> We obtained data on the total authorized positions at the functional combatant commands for fiscal year 2013 as well as the number of positions deemed by the command to be performing headquarters functions and included in DOD's planned reductions. To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed DOD officials, analyzed relevant manpower documentation, incorporated data-reliability questions into our data-collection instruments, and compared the multiple data sets received from DOD components against each other to ensure that there was consistency in the data that the commands provided. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also interviewed officials at the functional combatant commands, some of their respective subordinate unified commands, and the service component commands to discuss specific headquarters positions and organizations that will be affected by DOD's planned reductions in the commands and their service components.

We interviewed officials or, where appropriate, obtained documentation from the organizations listed below:

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<sup>4</sup>GAO, *Streamlining Government: Questions to Consider When Evaluating Proposals to Consolidate Physical Infrastructure and Management Functions*, [GAO-12-542](#) (Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2012).

Joint Staff

- Manpower and Personnel Directorate
- Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate

Department of the Air Force

- Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Personnel

Department of the Army

- Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller, Army Budget Office
- U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency

Department of the Navy

- Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

Unified Combatant Commands and Subordinate Unified Commands

- U.S. Strategic Command
  - U.S. Cyber Command
  - Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command
  - U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command
  - Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense
  - Air Force Global Strike Command
  - Air Force Space Command
- U.S. Special Operations Command
  - U.S. Army Special Operations Command
  - Air Force Special Operations Command
  - Naval Special Warfare Command
  - U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
  - Special Operations Command Central
- U.S. Transportation Command
  - Surface Deployment and Distribution Command



- Military Sealift Command
- Air Mobility Command
- Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to June 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

# Appendix II: Headquarters Locations of the Functional Combatant Commands, Their Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service Component Commands

This appendix contains information in noninteractive format presented in figure 1.

**Table 2: Headquarters Locations of the Functional Combatant Commands, Their Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service Component Commands**

Functional combatant command	Headquarters and component command locations
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)	SOCOM Headquarters, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
	Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
	Joint Special Operations University, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida
	Special Operations Command—Joint Capabilities, Norfolk, Virginia
	U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
	Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida
	Naval Special Warfare Command, Naval Base Coronado, California
	Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)	STRATCOM Headquarters, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
	U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Maryland
	Joint Functional Component Command-Global Strike, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
	Joint Functional Component Command-Space, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California
	Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense, Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado
	Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, District of Columbia
	U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
	Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
	Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, Virginia
	U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
	U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
	Air Force Global Strike Command, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana
	Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)	TRANSCOM Headquarters, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia
	Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
	Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
	Military Sealift Command, Washington Navy Yard, District of Columbia

Source: GAO Analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data.

# Appendix III: Resources at U.S. Special Operations Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 6)



## U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (SOCOM)




**Mission:** Provides special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests, and synchronizes planning of and operations against global terrorist networks.

**Headquarters:** MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

**Responsibility:** Daily planning for and execution of SOCOM's mission is performed by the command headquarters, three subordinate unified commands—Joint Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command–North, and Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities<sup>a</sup>—and two direct reporting units<sup>b</sup>—Special Operations Joint Task Force and a Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Center. SOCOM is also supported by four service component commands, which are the U.S. Army Special Operations Command; the Naval Special Warfare Command; the Air Force Special Operations Command; and the Marine Corps Special Operations Command.

### SOCOM's Organizational Structure

**Interactivity instructions:** Click on the combatant command name to see more information.  
See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439


<sup>a</sup>According to Special Operations Command officials, Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities was disestablished in fiscal year 2013 and positions will be zeroed out in fiscal year 2014.

<sup>b</sup>In fiscal year 2013, SOCOM listed authorized positions in three direct reporting units: Joint Military Information Support Command, Special Operations Joint Task Force, and a Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Center. However, the Joint Military Information Support Center was deactivated at the end of fiscal year 2011 and, according to SOCOM, one authorized military position remained on the Joint Table of Distribution in fiscal year 2013. This position was transferred to SOCOM headquarters operations directorate in fiscal year 2014.


### SOCOM's Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013<sup>a</sup>




### SOCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013<sup>c</sup>



### SOCOM's Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2013



### SOCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439


<sup>a</sup>Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded personnel requirements at the functional combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services. Data come from the functional combatant commands' Joint Tables of Distribution, which identify the positions that have been approved for each command. We limited our analysis to fiscal years 2004 through 2013, because SOCOM could not provide data on its authorized military and civilian positions for fiscal years 2001 through 2003.

<sup>b</sup>SOCOM's subordinate unified commands and direct-reporting units include: Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command–North, and Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities, Special Operations Joint Task Force, and a Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Center.


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<sup>c</sup>To fund authorized positions and the acquisition of special operations-specific equipment, SOCOM was given responsibility for supervising a separate budget account Major Force Program-11. Hence, costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and special operations-specific appropriations reported by DOD components, which include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. In addition to funding SOCOM headquarters, subordinate unified commands and direct reporting units, mission and headquarters support costs also fund authorized military and civilian positions at the geographic combatant commands' theater special operations commands. Costs to support headquarters operations do not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor do they include costs for overseas contingency operations.


### SOCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013<sup>a</sup>




### SOCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013<sup>b</sup>



### SOCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013



### SOCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>Service component commands include: Air Force Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, and Naval Special Warfare Command.

<sup>b</sup>Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operation and maintenance and special operations—specific appropriations reported by Department of Defense (DOD) components, which include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. This does not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor does it include costs for overseas contingency operations.

Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command			
U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters Directorates <sup>a</sup>	Military	Civilian	Total
J0 Command Staff	265	124	389
J2 Directorate of Intelligence	169	304	473
J3 Directorate of Operations	130	158	288
J4 Directorate of Logistics	30	31	61
J5 Directorate of Policy	79	20	99
J6 Directorate of Communications	62	101	163
Force Management Directorate	91	96	187
J8 Directorate of Resources, Requirements, and Strategic Assessments	58	53	111
Special Operations Financial Management	17	106	123
Interagency Task Force	20	11	31
Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center	44	278	322
Joint Special Operations University	26	67	93
<b>Headquarters Directorates Total</b>	<b>991</b>	<b>1,349</b>	<b>2,340</b>
Subordinate Unified Commands	Military	Civilian	Total
Joint Special Operations Command	994	583	1,577
Special Operations Command–North	29	0	29
Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities	34	17	51
<b>Subordinate Unified Command Total</b>	<b>1,057</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>1,657</b>
Direct Reporting Units	Military	Civilian	Total
Joint Military Information Support Command	1	0	1
Special Operations Joint Task Force	69	1	70
Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Center	25	0	25
<b>Direct Reporting Units Total</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>U.S. Special Operations Command Grand Total</b>	<b>2,143</b>	<b>1,950</b>	<b>4,093</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands' structure may include a principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical advice, and other groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.

Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command			
Service Component Commands	Military	Civilian	Total
Air Force Special Operations Command	396	314	710
U.S. Army Special Operations Command	278	424	702
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command	211	93	304
Naval Special Warfare Command	202	192	394
Service Component Command Grand Total	1,087	1,023	2,110

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439



# Appendix IV: Resources at U.S. Strategic Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 6)



## U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (STRATCOM)




**Mission:** STRATCOM conducts global operations in coordination with other combatant commands, military services, and appropriate U.S. government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States and its allies.

**Headquarters:** Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

**Responsibility:** Daily planning and execution for STRATCOM's mission is performed by one subunified command—U.S. Cyber Command—and seven component commands—Joint Functional Component Command-Global Strike; Joint Functional Component Command-Space; Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense; Joint Functional Component Command-Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; the STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination, and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center. STRATCOM is also supported by four service component commands, including Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Space Command, Army Space and Missile Defense Command / U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command, and Marine Corps Forces U.S. Strategic Command.


### STRATCOM's Organizational Structure

**Interactivity instructions:** Click on the combatant command name to see more information.  
See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439


### STRATCOM's Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013<sup>a</sup>




### STRATCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013<sup>c</sup>



### STRATCOM's Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013



### STRATCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439


<sup>a</sup>Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded personnel requirements at the functional combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services. Data come from the functional combatant commands' Joint Tables of Distribution, which identify the positions that have been approved for each command. Data included in the STRATCOM headquarters totals include those authorized positions that are part of the command's headquarters directorates (J0 through J9) and the Program Management Office.

<sup>b</sup>Data included in STRATCOM's component commands include those authorized positions at Joint Functional Component Commands for Global Strike, Space, Integrated Missile Defense, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; the STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; the Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination; and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center.


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<sup>c</sup>Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operation and maintenance appropriations, which include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. Costs to support headquarters operations do not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor do they include costs for overseas contingency operations.


### STRATCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013<sup>a</sup>




### STRATCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013<sup>b</sup>



### STRATCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013



### STRATCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>Service component commands include: Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Force Space Command, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command, and Army Space and Missile Defense Command / U.S. Army Strategic Command. U.S. Marine Forces Strategic Command had 14 authorized positions in fiscal year 2013.

<sup>b</sup>Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operation and maintenance appropriations, which include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. Costs to support headquarters operations do not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor does it include costs for overseas contingency operations. U.S. Marine Forces Strategic Command's fiscal year 2013 costs to support headquarters operations were \$447,077 million.

Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command			
U.S. Strategic Command Headquarters Directorates <sup>a</sup>	Military	Civilian	Total
J0 Command Staff	104	75	179
J1 Manpower and Personnel	18	33	51
J2 Intelligence	203	153	356
J3 Global Operations	242	245	487
J4 Logistics	11	37	48
J5 Plans and Policy	61	96	157
J6 C4 Systems	50	238	288
J7 Joint Exercises and Training	13	40	53
J8 Capability and Resource Integration	58	237	295
J9 Mission Assessment and Analysis	10	54	64
Program Management Office	4	22	26
<b>Headquarters Directorates Total</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>1,230</b>	<b>2,004</b>
Subunified Command	Military	Civilian	Total
U.S. Cyber Command	478	440	918
Component Commands	Military	Civilian	Total
Joint Functional Component Command for Space	185	78	263
Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike	352	243	595
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	61	18	79
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense	51	69	120
STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Elimination	53	21	74
Joint Warfare Analysis Center	42	371	413
<b>Component Command Total</b>	<b>744</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>1,544</b>
<b>U.S. Strategic Command Grand Total</b>	<b>1,996</b>	<b>2,470</b>	<b>4,466</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>Combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands' structure may include a principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical advice, and other groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the combatant commands in conducting their operational missions.

Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command			
Service Component Commands	Military	Civilian	Total
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, U.S. Strategic Command	11	3	14
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command	165	1,044	1,209
Air Force Global Strike Command	657	334	991
Air Force Space Command	742	621	1,363
Service Component Command Grand Total	1,575	2,002	3,577

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

# Appendix V: Resources at U.S. Transportation Command and Its Service Component Commands (Part 1 of 4)



## U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TRANSCOM)



**Mission:** TRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense (DOD) in time of peace and war, with a primary focus on wartime readiness.


**Headquarters:** Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

**Responsibility:** TRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD and is the manager of the DOD Transportation System, which relies on military and commercial resources to support DOD’s transportation needs. The command, among other responsibilities, provides commercial air, land, and sea transportation; terminal management; aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces; and is responsible for movement of DOD medical patients. TRANSCOM has one subordinate command—the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. TRANSCOM works with three component commands to accomplish its joint mission: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.

### TRANSCOM’s Organizational Structure


**Interactivity instructions:** Click on the combatant command name to see more information.

See appendix VII for the noninteractive, printer-friendly version.




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439


### TRANSCOM's Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013<sup>a</sup>




### TRANSCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013<sup>b</sup>



### TRANSCOM's Number of Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013



### TRANSCOM's Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>Authorized military and civilian positions represent approved, funded personnel requirements at the functional combatant commands and do not include personnel performing contract services. Data come from the functional combatant commands' Joint Tables of Distribution, which identify the positions that have been approved for each command.


<sup>b</sup>Costs to support headquarters operations represented here include both Transportation Working Capital Funds and operation and maintenance funds. These costs include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. Costs to support headquarters operations do not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor do they include costs for overseas contingency operations. Operation and maintenance costs increased in 2012 and 2013 because of the transfer of the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command from Joint Forces Command to TRANSCOM.




**TRANSCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2013<sup>a</sup>**




**TRANSCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013<sup>b</sup>**



**TRANSCOM's Service Component Commands' Authorized Military and Civilian Positions, Fiscal Year 2013**



**TRANSCOM's Service Component Commands' Costs to Support Headquarters Operations, Fiscal Year 2013**



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>Service Component Commands include: the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, the Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, and the Navy's Military Sealift Command.

<sup>b</sup>Costs to support headquarters operations represented here include both Transportation Working Capital Funds and operation and maintenance funds. These costs include compensation of civilian personnel and contract services, among others costs. Costs to support headquarters operations do not include the costs expended by other components such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor do they include costs for overseas contingency operations.

Fiscal Year 2013 Authorized Military and Civilian Positions by Directorate, Subordinate Command, and Component Command			
U.S. Transportation Command Headquarters Directorates <sup>a</sup>	Military	Civilian	Total
Command Staff	122	68	190
J1 Manpower and Personnel	19	35	54
J2 Intelligence	77	84	161
J3 Operations and Plans	369	85	454
J5/4 Strategy, Policy, and Logistics	46	75	121
J6 Command, Control, Communications, and Cyber Systems	31	110	141
J8 Program Analysis and Financial Management	6	75	81
J9 Joint Reserve Component Directorate	5	0	5
Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center	5	6	11
Directorate of Acquisition	12	176	188
<b>Headquarters Directorates Total</b>	<b>692</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>1,406</b>
Subunified Command	Military	Civilian	Total
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command	493	57	550
<b>Subordinate Unified Command Total</b>	<b>493</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>550</b>
<b>U.S. Transportation Command Grand Total</b>	<b>1,185</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>1,956</b>
Service Component Commands	Military	Civilian	Total
Air Mobility Command	604	541	1,145
Military Sealift Command	46	192	238
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command	49	695	744
<b>Service Component Commands Grand Total</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>1,428</b>	<b>2,127</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and component data. | GAO-14-439

<sup>a</sup>The combatant commanders have broad authority to organize and structure their commands as they deem necessary to achieve their assigned missions. The commands' structure may include a principal staff officer, personal staff to the commander, a special staff group for technical or tactical advice, and other groups of staff who are responsible for managing personnel, ensuring the availability of intelligence, directing operations, coordinating logistics, preparing long-range or future plans, and integrating communications systems. The commands may also have subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, and other activities, each with their own staff, which support the combatant commands in conducting their operational missions. For TRANSCOM, command staff numbers include the Staff Judge Advocate and the Command Surgeon.

# Appendix VI: Costs to Support Headquarters Operations in Nominal Terms

**Table 3: Costs to Support Headquarters Operations at the Functional Combatant Commands in Fiscal Years 2001 through 2013 Dollars**

Combatant command	Fiscal year 2001	Fiscal year 2002	Fiscal year 2003	Fiscal year 2004	Fiscal year 2005	Fiscal year 2006	Fiscal year 2007	Fiscal year 2008	Fiscal year 2009	Fiscal year 2010	Fiscal year 2011	Fiscal year 2012	Fiscal year 2013
U.S. Strategic Command	\$119,624,389	\$ 131,616,659	\$244,511,402	\$347,795,035	\$396,001,346	\$410,354,469	\$393,738,146	\$413,957,747	\$448,427,316	\$562,767,722	\$648,450,112	\$509,085,311	\$623,440,707
U.S. Special Operations Command	54,909,000	59,154,000	72,907,000	87,828,000	101,131,000	134,507,000	234,376,000	261,343,000	431,242,000	399,982,000	411,496,000	476,225,000	466,920,000
U.S. Transportation Command	40,843,000	36,337,000	36,512,000	41,646,000	43,667,000	66,785,000	72,482,000	106,730,000	115,862,000	95,482,000	111,741,000	138,670,000	145,167,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$215,376,389</b>	<b>\$227,107,659</b>	<b>\$353,930,402</b>	<b>\$477,269,035</b>	<b>\$540,799,346</b>	<b>\$611,646,469</b>	<b>\$700,596,146</b>	<b>\$782,030,747</b>	<b>\$995,531,316</b>	<b>\$1,058,231,722</b>	<b>\$1,171,687,112</b>	<b>\$1,123,980,311</b>	<b>\$1,235,527,707</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data.

Note: Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operations and maintenance funding, special operation forces funding, and working capital fund costs reported by DOD components and are in nominal dollars.

Appendix VI: Costs to Support Headquarters  
Operations  
in Nominal Terms

**Table 4: Costs to Support Headquarters Operations at the Functional Combatant Commands' Service Component Commands in Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013 Dollars**

Service component command	Fiscal year 2008	Fiscal year 2009	Fiscal year 2010	Fiscal year 2011	Fiscal year 2012	Fiscal year 2013
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command	\$22,135,840	\$25,302,620	\$32,586,615	\$32,696,898	\$29,964,524	\$28,461,180
Air Force Global Strike Command			48,937,217	46,191,990	49,042,936	40,589,326
Air Force Space Command	44,756,655	58,048,935	80,418,283	89,921,006	75,484,265	60,133,982
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, U.S. Strategic Command	455,745	515,297	600,834	584,992	578,359	447,077
<b>U.S. Strategic Command's service component commands' totals</b>	<b>\$67,348,241</b>	<b>\$83,866,852</b>	<b>\$162,542,948</b>	<b>\$169,394,886</b>	<b>\$155,070,083</b>	<b>\$129,631,565</b>
Naval Special Warfare Command	24,545,000	31,734,000	30,041,000	34,407,000	36,371,000	33,215,000
U.S. Army Special Operations Command	134,634,768	135,069,504	163,624,023	160,662,024	155,458,496	159,716,581
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command	7,650,398	7,087,173	12,693,960	12,996,194	16,025,237	16,186,429
Air Force Special Operations Command	26,310,141	26,858,467	29,433,115	30,035,871	28,098,593	29,389,702
<b>U.S. Special Operations Command's service component commands' totals</b>	<b>\$193,140,308</b>	<b>\$200,749,144</b>	<b>\$235,792,097</b>	<b>\$238,101,089</b>	<b>\$235,953,326</b>	<b>\$238,507,711</b>
Air Mobility Command	122,034,355	116,086,356	137,639,867	148,075,436	133,544,690	112,022,186
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command	99,800,000	91,100,000	104,400,000	106,200,000	109,500,000	104,700,000
Military Sealift Command	83,300,000	80,300,000	76,700,000	73,700,000	79,300,000	72,100,000
<b>U.S. Transportation Command's service component commands' totals</b>	<b>\$305,134,355</b>	<b>\$287,486,356</b>	<b>\$318,739,867</b>	<b>\$327,975,436</b>	<b>\$322,344,690</b>	<b>\$288,822,186</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>\$565,622,904</b>	<b>\$572,102,352</b>	<b>\$717,074,913</b>	<b>\$735,471,411</b>	<b>\$713,368,099</b>	<b>\$656,961,463</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) data.

Note: Costs to support headquarters operations reflect obligations for operation and maintenance funding, Special Operation Forces funding, and working capital fund costs reported by DOD components and are in nominal dollars.

# Appendix VII: Functional Combatant Command Organizational Structure Descriptions

This appendix contains information in noninteractive format presented in the organizational charts in appendixes III, IV, and V.

**Table 5: Organizational Descriptions of the Functional Combatant Commands, Their Subordinate Unified Commands, and Their Service Component Commands**

Functional combatant command	Organizational descriptions
<b>U.S. Special Operations Command</b>	
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Headquarters	Provides fully capable special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests and synchronizes the planning of global operations against terrorist networks.
Joint Special Operations Command	Studies special operations requirements and techniques, ensures interoperability and equipment standardization, plans and conducts special operations exercises and training, and develops joint special operations tactics.
U.S. Special Operations Command–North	Enhances command and control of special operations forces throughout the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility and improves support to interagency counterterrorism operations.
Special Operations Command–Joint Capabilities	Trains conventional and special operations force commanders and staffs in the employment of special operations forces, focusing on the integration of special operations and conventional forces.
Special Operations Joint Task Force when active	Operational-level organization that may have one or more subordinate joint special operations task forces for crisis response, contingency, and major operations and campaigns, including all enabling capabilities required to optimize effectiveness.
Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Center	Enables the global special operations forces network, and are regional, multilateral engagement hubs for facilitating communication and interoperability among global special operations force partners.
U.S. Army Special Operations Command	Provides fully prepared Army special operations forces to conduct worldwide special operations in support of geographic combatant commanders, American ambassadors, and other agencies as directed.
Naval Special Warfare Command	Provides fully prepared Naval Special Warfare Forces for operations and activities abroad in support of combatant commanders and U.S. national interests.
Air Force Special Operations Command	Provides combat-ready Air Force special operations forces to conduct and support global special operations missions.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command	Provides task-organized, scalable, and responsive Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide to accomplish missions assigned by the SOCOM commander or geographic combatant commanders.
<b>U.S. Strategic Command</b>	
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Headquarters	Conducts global operations in coordination with other combatant commands, services, and appropriate U.S. government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the United States and its allies.
U.S. Cyber Command	Plans for and conducts activities to defend the Department of Defense's (DOD) information networks and, when directed, conducts cyberspace operations in order to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of action in cyberspace.
Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike	Conducts kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and nonkinetic effects planning and manages global force activities to assure allies and to deter and dissuade actions detrimental to the United States and its global interests.

**Appendix VII: Functional Combatant Command  
Organizational Structure Descriptions**

<b>Functional combatant command</b>	<b>Organizational descriptions</b>
Joint Functional Component Command for Space	Conducts space operations to provide tailored, responsive, local, and global effects in support of national, STRATCOM, and combatant commander objectives.
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense	Synchronizes operational missile defense planning, conducts global ballistic missile defense operations support, and coordinates global missile defense capabilities and requirements.
Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	Identifies and recommends appropriate resources to meet high-priority intelligence requirements and helps ensure the best use of resources to provide decision makers and troops with information when and where needed.
Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction	Provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with expertise in contingency and crisis planning to interdict and eliminate the proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.
Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination	Plans and trains to enable the command and control of weapons of mass destruction elimination operations in support of geographic combatant commands and deploys to augment existing headquarters or provide a Joint Task Force to execute weapons of mass destruction elimination operations.
Joint Warfare Analysis Center	Assists warfighters in solving complex challenges in support of national security, coordinating directly with the staffs of all unified commands, combatant commands, DOD elements, military services, and other government departments and agencies.
U.S. Marine Corps Forces Strategic Command	Advises STRATCOM, subordinate joint force commanders, and functional component and service component commanders on the proper employment of Marine Corps forces and capabilities.
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command	Conducts space and missile defense operations and provides planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of STRATCOM missions. Also serves as the Army specified proponent for space, high-altitude, and ground-based midcourse defense and is the operational integrator for global missile defense.
Air Force Global Strike Command	Develops and provides combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.
Air Force Space Command	Provides space and cyberspace forces for STRATCOM.
<b>U.S. Transportation Command</b>	
U.S. Transportation Command Headquarters	Provides full-spectrum global mobility solutions and related enabling capabilities for supporting customers' requirements through the movement and deployment of forces and materiel.
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command	Provides mission-tailored, joint-capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements.
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command	Provides global deployment and distribution capabilities to meet national security objectives and works with U.S. transportation providers to conduct port operations for worldwide surface movement.
Military Sealift Command	Operates the ships that sustain the U.S. warfighting force and delivers specialized maritime services in support of national security objectives.
Air Mobility Command	Provides airlift, aerial refueling, air mobility support, and aeromedical evacuation capability; plans, coordinates, and manages commercial airlift; and transports humanitarian supplies around the world.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.

# Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense



**THE JOINT STAFF**  
WASHINGTON, DC

28 May 2014

Mr. Richard Geiger  
Assistant Director  
Defense Capabilities and Management  
U.S. Government Accountability Office  
441 G Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20548


Dear Mr. Geiger:

The Department of Defense has reviewed draft report GAO-14-439, "Defense Headquarters: DoD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands," dated 23 April 2014 (GAO Code 351826).

The Department is providing the enclosed official written remarks, to include technical and significant issue comments and/or corrections, regarding the three report recommendations.

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I appreciate your efforts to highlight better use of resources devoted to the functional Combatant Commands.

Sincerely,

  
DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:  
As stated

cc:  
USD(P&R)  
Service Chiefs  
CDR, USSOCOM  
CDR, USSTRATCOM  
CDR, USSTRATCOM  
Director, CAPE  
Director, J-8

GAO DRAFT REPORT, GAO-14-439, "DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS: DOD  
NEEDS TO REEVALUATE ITS APPROACH FOR MANAGING RESOURCES  
DEVOTED TO THE FUNCTION COMBATANT COMMAND,"  
DATED APRIL 23, 2014 (GAO CODE 351826)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO  
RECOMMENDATIONS

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** Reevaluate the decision to focus reductions on management headquarters to ensure the department's efforts ultimately result in meaningful savings.

**DoD RESPONSE:** Partially Concur. Reductions across the Department would garner greater savings; however, this is a Department-wide recommendation and seems to be outside the scope of this study. Additionally, while the focus of the PB15 SECDEF's reductions cited in this report was MHQs, the Services, under the "do unto others" concept, were allowed to reduce below-the-line (BLT) organizations, to include the COCOMs (both dollars and FTEs) in proportion to cuts that they applied to themselves (USA 15%, AF 7%, USMC 5% and USN 3%).

Additionally, we question the use of the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) from eJMAPs, (a personnel data base) vs. the OSD Data Warehouse FYDP, (funded authorizations) for this study. Data trends may be skewed since the JTD is a point-in-time look at on hand personnel.

Finally, there were significant points of fact raised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation; US Special Operations Command and United States Transportation Command (attached).

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** Set a clearly defined and consistently applied starting point as a baseline for the reductions.

**DoD RESPONSE:** Concur. Recommend the use of the OSD Data Warehouse FYDP to set the baseline across the Department. COCOMs have clearly defined MHQ Program Element Codes that are easily recognizable and replicable. OSD is currently implementing a MHQ flag within the data elements of the DoD Resource Data Warehouse (DRDW) which will facilitate the tracking and reporting of MHQ across the rest of the enterprise.

**RECOMMENDATION 3:** Track reductions against the baselines in order to provide reliable accounting of savings and reporting to Congress.

**DoD RESPONSE:** Concur. By using FYDP data, baselines are clearly defined and changes to the baseline can be easily tracked and reported to congress. Both the utilization of the FYDP and the enhancement of the DRDW data elements will increase the Departments capability to provide efficient, effective, and replicable data analysis.



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# Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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## GAO Contact

John Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or [pendletonj@gao.gov](mailto:pendletonj@gao.gov)

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## Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report include Richard K. Geiger (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Robert B. Brown, Tobin J. McMurdie, Carol D. Petersen, Michael Silver, Amie Steele, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Kristy Williams.

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